I am proposing a thesis which claims that a person whom we characterize as self-deceived believes not-p and does not know, or even believe, p. Furthermore, I claim that the self-deceived does not engage in an act of deception, e.g., he does not persuade himself to believe not-p, but, never theless, we may properly call him "self-deceived." This interpretation will rid us of the apparent paradox without losing the phenomenon. The following sections will give an explanation of this view and attempt to answer the following questions which might be raised: While I agree with other writers on self-deception that in "A is self-deceived" it is true that A is deceived, I do not agree that he deceives himself, if part of the meaning of "he deceives himself" is taken as "he knows p." Penelhum: "The concepts of self-deception has seemed to seme to generate paradoxes, to make us claim, for example, that a man both does and does not believe the same proposi tion. ... The only way of avoiding the reinstatement of the paradox here is to accept the fact which paradoxical render ings feed upon: that self-deception is a conflict state." Penelhum, p. 258.
Fingarette: "It is correct to say that, even if we assume no motive, we would call a person self-deceived if he per suaded himself to believe what in his heart he knows is not so." Fingarette, p. 28.
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An immediate, obvious objection is this: If "self-deceived" does not mean "he deceives himself," which seems to entail that he knows p (and is what we usually take it to mean), what else can it mean? It is not enough to say it just means "he is deceived" because we want to know who is deceiving him and how he is being deceived. If he is deceived and no other is deceiving him, then is he not deceiving himself? In other words, if one wants to maintain that the self-deceived does not know p and yet wants to retain the expression "selfdeception," it will have to be shown that A does not know p and that we can still make sense of the expression "A is self-deceived" (and/or "he's deceiving himself").
A partial answer to these objections is that while it is true that when we say "A is self-deceived" at least part of what we usually mean is that no other is deceiving him, it does not follow from that that he is deceiving himself in the sense that he knows (and believes) p (but "persuades" himself of not-p). What the expression "self-deceived" does point out is that no other person is trying to deceive him, but A is, nevertheless, deceived: he believes not-p. But to conclude from this that A must know p and that there is not only one who is deceived but an agent (who commits an act of deception) as well is unwarranted. It stems from the uncritical acceptance of "he deceives himself" as some how analogous to "A deceives B" (where A and B are two dif ferent persons), so we are misled into analyzing it in the same way. In "A deceives B" there is a deceiver who knows ("A"), an act of deception ("deceives"), and a person who does not know and upon whom the act is perpetrated ("B*?). From the similarity of form it looks as though "he deceives himself" might be susceptible to the same kind of analysis, i.e., a deceiver who knows ("he"), an act of deception ("deceives") being perpetrated on the deceived ("himself"). Thus from the joining of "A deceives B" to "He deceives him self" emerges the paradox. My analysis of "he deceives him self" will become obvious as the paper proceeds, but to anticipate, I will say that when we say "he deceives himself" it is not the opposition between what he knows and what he believes, but, rather, it is the opposition between what we know and what he believes which we find so bothersome.® What we know is something the self-deceived ought to know and would know were it not for certain emotional needs of his, i.e., his belief is engendered and sustained by certain emotional needs (e.g., his desires, anxieties, expecta tions, etc.). I would agree with Patrick Gardiner's comment on this aspect of self-deception when he says:
Even writers who claim to have discarded the other-deception model reintroduce it when they take "he deceives himself" to mean that he knows (at least in some sense) p and believes not-p, and in their use of expressions like "he persuades himself" to believe (or "he makes himself" believe) the con trary of what he knows.?
There are two distinct but related mistakes involved in the apparent paradox. The first mistake is to say that the self-deceived both believes p and believes not-p. The second mistake is to assume that where one is deceived there must be an agent who engages in an act of deception. This second mistake is related to the first in that both use other-decep tion as their model. In other-deception there is a victim (the one deceived) and a villain (the one who deceives). The victim does not know p and believes not-p. The villain does know and believe p. Hence the talk, when applied to self-deception, of the self-deceived as one who believes p and believes not-p at the same time. In other-deception it is also clear that there is an act of deception, so now we have victim, villain, and act of deception, which is the model used for self-deception and becomes the source of the second mistake. It is this other-deception model which gives us the picture of believing both p and not-p at the same time. Once we break the hold of the other-deception model we will see that it is not the case that the self-deceived both knows (and believes) p and believes not-p. Furthermore, it is not the case that where one is deceived there must be a deceiver who engages in an act of deception. "It is, for example, not clear what could be meant by, or what justification there could be for, speak ing of somebody as deceiving himself if it were at the same time contended that what he was said to be de ceiving himself about was a matter of total indif ference to him, in no way related to his wants, fears, hopes and so forth: could we, e.g., intelligibly talk about 'disinterested' or 'gratuitous' self-deception." See his article "Error, Faith and Self-Deception," in Proceed ings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol LXX, 1970, page 240.
7
J. Canfield & D. Gustavson, for example, who explicitly reject other-deception as a model, say, "...it is possible to interpret self-deception as a special case of self-command i.e., as making oneself believe something or forget something See "Self-Deception" in Analysis, Vol 23, pp 32-36. This quote is on page 33 (their italics).
448
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I
It is assumed, rightly I think, that in genuine cases of deception (i.e., where one intends to deceive another, not necessarily in cases where one unintentionally deceives another) the knowledge of p must be prior to a successful act of deception about p. It is important to note that where one intentionally deceives the knowledge of p must be active at the time of deception, e.g., it cannot be some thing which the deceiver once knew but has forgotten at the time of the act. So the deceiver knows p before and during the act of deception. It is also assumed (and again I agree) that the self-deceived has the same evidence for p which we all have, and in this respect it is unlike other-deception. But if A, who is self-deceived, has the same evidence as the rest of us (from which we draw the conclusion p) and does know p, then it seems that he has already seen the evidence and drawn the correct conclusion but has now given the evi dence a second reading, misinterpreted it this time, and concluded not-p.
However, the fact that he misinterprets (and/or ignores) evidence is not enough to show that he is self-deceived. Most of us, at some time, misinterpret facts and draw mis taken conclusions. Scientists, historians, and detectives, at times, misinterpret and/or ignore evidence but we do not, on that basis alone, call them self-deceived.^ Those hold ing the view that the self-deceived knows p would have to show that he knows p while in a state of self-deception, and this is what is usually assumed but not shown. In de fense they might say, "Well, you agree that he sees the evidence, so he must know p." But the evidence is evidence for the proposition "p" (what is the case) not for the proposition "he knows p" (which is what the claim is). Nor will it do to show that the self-deceived knew p at some time in the past. It may be obvious, but it should nevertheless be kept in mind, that we must be aware of tense-shift in discussions of self-deception. Whether the self-deceived knew p in the past is irrelevant, what is relevant is whether he knows p now, i.e., at the time he is in a state of selfdeception. This does not exclude past (or future) knowledge of p. Normally, when we talk about self-deception, it is O Henceforth when I use "misinterpret the evidence," I mean to include in that expression cases where the person might misinterpret and/or ignore at least some of the evidence. There might be an objection raised here, i.e., is it not possible that the actions of the self-deceived go against his Claim to believe not-p? This possibility will be discuss ed at the end of this section.
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Let us first look at what might be a common case of selfdeception: Mrs. Smith who believes her son, Timmy, is a good boy (not-p) when he is really a scoundrel (p).
The evidence shows what we know to be true, è.g., Timmy is a bully, he lies, steals, and cheats. We see Timmy hitting smaller children without provocation. We hear him lie that they hit him first. We watch him steal toys from other children and then say that the children gave him the toys. We watch him cheat while he is playing games. Mrs. Smith sees the same evidence we do but steadfastly maintains that Timmy is a good boy. She certainly seems to be sincere when she tells us that Timmy is a good boy, and we know that she is, in other circumstances, a very reasonable and honest person. We are puzzled. We wonder why she can't see that Timmy is a scoundrel, since it is ovbious (to us). We might say something like, "she sees the same things we do, she must know it, all the evidence is there." We finally decide 450 
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that "she is deceiving herself" and that "she must know" and do not inquire into how she is deceiving herself or what it means to say "she must know." Mrs. Smith is self-deceived in that she believes not-p although p is true, she interprets the evidence in such a way as to conclude not-p, and not-p is a desirable belief.Ĥ ow did she come to believe not-p?
It is possible that initially Mrs. Smith believed not-p and had some evidence for it. Timmy was a happy baby and developed normally as a pre-school child, in such a way that one could characterize him (accurately) as "a good boy." When he started school, however, he got into bad company, and learned to lie, steal, cheat, and bully. At this point "Timmy is a good boy" becomes false and "Timmy is a scoundrel" becomes true.-*-® Mrs. Smith continues to believe Timmy is a good boy (not-p). What she now sees (i.e., the facts which the rest of us accept as evidence that Timmy is a scoundrel) she interprets incorrectly because she believes not-p and not because though she knows p she has somehow succeeded in "mak ing herself believe" not-p. We are not satisfied with her constant "explanations" of Timmy's behavior and feel that "she must know" p. To us she seems only to be trying to
9
Writers on self-deception seem to agree that the selfdeceived consistently interprets the facts differently from the rest of us. But if someone consistently misinterprets the evidence, does this not show that he does not know (is it not something like the "seeing as" case, i.e., someone consistently sees x as y. Would we, after he sees x as y for the hundfeth time, and never sees it as x, still want to say that he must see x? If so, on what grounds?)? I n the beginning her belief is true, circumstances change but her belief does not. In some case of self-deception the belief may be false to begin with but in those cases it is probably because there is no evidence available to the person which goes against the belief, e.g., a person may believe his (her) spouse is faithful but in fact the spouse is unfaithful. The spouse may even have been unfaithful since the day they were married, but the self-deceived has no evidence available to indicate that this is the case. But even in cases such as this, where the belief was never true, there is usually some reason for the false belief (possibly marriage vows in thxs case).
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451 "persuade herself" of not-p, and we characterize her as "selfdeceived."^-^ It has not been shown, however, that Mrs. Smith actually knows p (although, admittedly, she is in a position to know p), or even that she is attempting to persuade her self of not-p. What is clear is only that she believes not-p. Mrs. Smith is attempting to persuade the rest of us of what she "knows," her explanations are not an attempt to persuade herself of not-p, for she really believes that. She is trying to persuade others of what she thinks she knows. We do not usually have to persuade ourselves of what we al ready (think we) know.
In Mrs. Smith's case her other verbal behavior (i.e., other than her claimed belief in not-p) and her non-verbal behavior correspond to her belief in not-p (her non-verbal behavior: she rewards Timmy "for being good," she never spanks him, etc.). But what about a case of self-deception where the self-deceived person's non-verbal behavior seems to go against his claimed belief? The case of the alcoholic seems to be such a case. He is neither a hypocrite nor is he pretending when he says, "I am a social drinker" (not-p), but, neverthe less, his actions do seem to "say" something different than his claim, i.e., his actions show that he is an alcoholic (p). His claim, which seems sincere, that there is very little difference, if any, between his drinking and that of others is contradicted by his behavior. It looks as though his behavior is not in accord with his belief in not-p.
I agree that there are cases of self-deception (such as the case of the alcoholic) where the behavior of the selfdeceived is not in accord with his stated belief. However, We may even say, "she does not want to believe that her son is a scoundrel," or she does not want to see that her son is doing those things we mentioned," and these expressions can be read as indicating that our ordinary language suggests that she does know p (but does not want to believe it, or is trying somehow to persuade herself of not-p). I think there is an alternative way of reading those expressions which indicate not that she knows p but that she has a vested emotional interest in not-p, i.e., she wants to believe not-p and does believe not-p. The fact that someone wants to be lieve not-p and even says that he does believe not-p are rather unusual grounds for claiming that he knows p. Another related expression which seems to support my contention that she does not know p is the one in ordinary language which says, "it's in front of her eyes but she does not see it," i.e., the evidence is there but she does not take it as evidence for p. All of these expressions, rather than supporting the claim that the self-deceived knows p, seem to lean the other way, i.e., she wants to, and does, believe not-p.
it is important to note here that the evidence for p i£ his non-verbal behavior whereas in the previous example we were able to separate the evidence for p (e.g., Timmy's behavior) from the verbal and non-verbal behavior of the self-deceived person (Mrs. Smith's stated belief in not-p and her acting towards Timmy and others as if she believed that Timmy was not a scoundrel).
The alcoholic's non-verbal behavior does not show that he believes something other than what he claims to believe. What his non-verbal behavior shows is that he is an alcoholic, not that he knows he is an alcoholic. When the evidence for p (viz., his behavior) is pointed out to him, he misinterprets, he rationalizes, in the same manner as Mrs. Smith does. For example, if we point out that whenever he receives his paycheck he always pays his bar and liquor store bills before any other bills he might respond with, "the bartender is a good friend and trusts me, I don't want to let him down," or perhaps, "the liquor store will cut off my credit if I don't pay every month, but I can always skip a credit card payment or the rent payment without getting my credit cut off or being forced to move." He does not say, "I'm an alcoholic, so I take care of the bar bill and liquor bill first." Neither his verbal behavior nor his non-verbal behavior shows that he believes p (although his non-verbal behavior is, for others, evidence for p) . 2 so the case of the self-deceived person whose actions seem to go against his claimed belief is subject to the same analysis as the previous example once we understand that in the case of the alcoholic his non verbal behavior is the evidence for p. Once the alcoholic acknowledges what the rest of us know, viz., that he is an alcoholic, then he is no longer self-deceived.
We should 12 Of course, alcoholism is a complex phenomenon which is, of necessity, being over-simplified here. However, that an alcoholic does act this way is obvious to anyone who has known an alcoholic or even given a cursory look at the litera ture on alcoholism. G-l 453 also note that one of the reasons that we are inclined to say that the alcoholic is self-deceived (rather than, for example, calling him a hypocrite) is because we assume that he does not realize that he is an alcoholic, i.e., he does not know p.
II
If the self-deceived does not know p how does he differ from one who is just ignorant or one who merely holds a false belief? Self-deception is like ignorance in that the self-deceived does not know p and, like ignorance, it may be not only that he does not know p but that he may have known p at one time but has now forgotten it, in which case he does not know p, he is ignorant of p. Self-deception sometimes has the ap pearance of ignorance, but in various ways the self-deceived person is different from one who is simply ignorant. When we say of someone that he is ignorant about a particular subject we usually mean he is uninformed or misinformed about the facts.The self-deceived, however, is neither uniform ed nor misinformed about the facts relating to p. If a reasonable person is ignorant with respect to p, that ignor ance can usually be rectified by his being apprised of the facts. This is not the case with the self-deceived.
Another distinction between the one who is ignorant of p and the self-deceived is that the latter has a desire or need for not-p to be true. The former normally does not have such a need or desire. When the evidence is presented, the one who was ignorant accepts p whereas the self-deceived person gives us counter-arguments or rationalizations. The ignorant one does not persist in his denial of p, the selfdeceived does.
14 There is a colloquial usage where the word means a person is just unable to understand, i.e., he is mentally incapable of understanding (e.g., "he is just ignorant, he will never understand no matter how much you explain it to him"), but the self-deceived is not ignorant in this sense. We are amazed by his reactions to the evidence because we think that he is normally a reasonable person and is cap able of understanding once his error is pointed out to him. 454 
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The distinction between false belief and self-deception follows lines similar to that between ignorance and selfdeception. Normally when the evidence which is contrary to our false belief is presented to us, we do not point to what was previously the case, or misinterpret the evidence, in order to hold on to our false belief (although we may point to it to show how we came to believe falsely). A reasonable person, when faced with evidence which all others around him accept, but which is contrary to his belief, does not con sistently misinterpret the evidence and insist that he is right but simply drops the belief. When I say that the selfdeceived is acting unreasonably by not dropping the belief, I do not mean that he knows p but will not accept it, but that a reasonable person in that situation would know p, i.e., the self-deceived should know p, but does not.Î t might be argued that on my interpretation we have ob literated the distinction between wishful thinking and selfdeception, i.e., in wishful thinking one also holds a false belief because of some emotional need that the belief is true.
It is this emotional need which gives the wishful thinker his motive: if this need did not exist he would not hold this false belief and in these aspects it looks as if what I have described as self-deception could also be wishful thinking.
Although there are these similarities, there are also dif ferences. One of the differences between wishful thinking and self-deception is that the wishful thinker when faced with evidence which is contrary to his belief, will accept that evidence and its natural implications. As we have seen, the self-deceived person does not accept the evidence. In fact, he reaffirms his belief in not-p, and tries to justify it by misinterpreting the evidence.
15 A word about mistake in self-deception. If there is a mistake involved it is not a simple mistaking one thing for another but, as Frederick Siegler has pointed out, it is a mistake at the level of inference. Siegler however, takes the mistaken inference as leading to the false belief (and he espouses the "he persuades himself" argument) which I think is wrong. He says, "But in self-deception this distor tion is in the manipulation or twisting of evidence that we get, and it is at the level of inference which leads to be liefs." See F. Siegler, "An Analysis of Self-Deception," Nous, Vol II, No 2, May 1968. The mistaken inference, as I see it, is an attempt to justify the false belief, which the selfdeceived already has. So rather than leading to the false belief, the mistaken inference is a consequent of that belief.
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Another difference is that the self-deceived person must hold a false belief whereas in wishful thinking, at least in some cases, there is no false belief involved. Consider the following: Someone expresses a desire to win the Irish Sweepstakes and even talks about what he will do with the money. We say to him, "It is foolish to talk about what you will do with the money which you have not won, and the odds of your winning are probably a million to one." He replies, "I know that, it is just wishful thinking on my part." This example shows that wishful thinking does not necessarily in volve a false belief, in the usual sense of that term, i.e., it may be more like fantasy or day-dreaming, and we do not normally say of the day-dreamer that he has a false belief. The wishful thinker accepts p (e.g., it is the case that he has not won the Irish Sweepstakes) and yet wishes for not-p, i.e., thinks what it would be like if not-p were true, he knows p but wishes for not-p (he does not believe not-p). The wishful thinker entertains a possibility, the selfdeceived believes falsely. Even where the wishful thinker does hold a false belief, it is usually because he does not have all the evidence for p. If he held on to not-p when faced with the evidence which the rest of us accept as lead ing to p, he could then be called self-deceived. Wishful thinking, then, may shade into self-deception if, when pre sented with the evidence which is contrary to his belief, the wishful thinker continues to believe not-p and denies p. Wishful thinking is usually either a case of not holding a false belief (i.e., something akin to daydreaming) or of holding a false belief but not yet having all the evidence others have which goes against the belief.
Another aspect of wishful thinking is that of its selfascribing character. We find nothing strange about selfascribing expressions of the wishful thinking sort, e.g., "I am just engaging in wishful thinking when I think about winning the Irish Sweepstakes." But we do find it strange to use a similar expression in the self-deception case, e.g., it would be rather strange for Mrs. Smith to say, "I am just engaging in self-deception when I believe that Timmy is a good boy." There is a legitimate first person present tense usage of wishful thinking expressions but there is no such use for self-deception. However, there is a place for hypotheticals in self-deception, e.g., "I may be deceiving myself but I believe that Timmy is a good boy," and even a place for expressions like, "I try to convince myself that Timmy does not really mean to hurt the smaller boys." But both of these expressions express doubt as to whether not-p is true, whereas in self-deception the self-deceived does not doubt not-p but sincerely says he believes not-p, and acts in ac cordance with that belief. The expressions which do allow this self-ascribing character to self-deception are of the G-4 sort I have just mentioned, i.e., those which express doubt (others might be those which are said in jest).
Ill
In our discussion of the epistemic aspect of self-decep tion, we should examine a few more examples of our everyday talk about self-deception and see if such an examination can shed some light on the role of knowing and believing in selfdeception. If we ask the self-deceived person whether he just believes not-p or knows it, he would usually answer that he knows it (e.g., "I know Timmy is a good boy"). If, on the other hand, we ask him if he knows or believes p he will deny such knowledge or belief (e.g., "Timmy would not cheat or steal"). It is an important fact about a self-deceived per son that he will, apparently sincerely, say he knows (or be lieves) not-p, but will not say he knows (or believes) p.
It is important because part of the way we judge what a per son knows or believes is by what he sincerely says, and what the self-deceived sincerely says indicates that he (thinks he) knows not-p and that he does not know (or believe) p.
In first person present tense usage the self-deceived characterizes his false belief as knowledge but he does not do so when he is no longer self-deceived (i.e., in first person past tense). The first person past tense usage indi cates that he sees his former belief just as others see it. It also shows that he did not know p at the time he was selfdeceived. He says, about p, "I just couldn't believe it," or, "I should have known it but I didn't." These utterances seem to indicate that the evidence was there but he did not take it as leading to p, i.e., he did not know p.
How does one come out of self-deception? Not by acknowledg ing what one (the self-deceived) already knows, but by ac knowledging what others already know, i.e., it is when we recognize, when we know, p that we are finally out of selfdeception. When we say that a person is no longer selfdeceived because he now adknowledges what he "really knew," ! what we should be saying is that he now acknowledges what we already knew. The reason we called him "self-deceived" was not because he knew p and believed not-p but because he believed not-p though all others around him believed p, and no other was deceiving him. It is his prior belief in not-p and his emotional need which is satisfied by this belief, which is active at the time he is self-deceived, which causes the misinterpretation, and thus the self-deception.
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I V
We must now try to differentiate between one who is reluc tant to believe and one who is self-deceived. The reluctance to believe case is similar to the self-deception case in that the person who is reluctant to believe has a motivated belief, i.e., he has a desire to believe not-p, although p is the case. Reluctance to believe occurs, for example, when someone who is very close to us dies and we think, and even say, "I know he is dead, but I can't believe it." Ex pressions like, "I know p, but I can't believe it," "I know p, but I find it hard to believe," "I know p, but I'm re luctant to believe it" are examples of reluctance to believe expressions. Now it is immediately clear that this person, let's call him "the reluctant one," is different from the self-deceived person in an obvious way, i.e., the former will say he knows p and the latter will not. The reluctant one knows p and says he knows p (but is reluctant to believe it) whereas in self-deception the self-deceived person does not say he knows p nor does he say he is reluctant to believe p, but simply does not believe p. The reluctant one will usual ly admit that he knows p and also express his disinclination to believe p. The self-deceived, on the other hand, neither admits he knows p nor does he express reluctance to believe p. On the contrary, he emphatically denies p.
The self-deceived would not characterize himself as re luctant to believe although others might characterize him that way. Just as there is no first person present tense use for self-deception, so there is no first person present tense use for "reluctant to believe" for the self-deceived about that which he is self-deceived (whereas there certainly is such a use for the reluctant one). Furthermore, the selfdeceived person does not see where the evidence points, the reluctant one does. The reluctant one does know and says he knows p . I suggest that the role of "self" in "self-deception" is to point out that the person who is deceived is not being deceived by others and is not being deceived by appearances but is somehow the cause of his own deception. In exactly what way he is the cause of his own deception will become clear shortly, but it is not as an agent engaging in an act of deception upon himself. In the "he knows p but persuades himself of not-p" approach, ° it appears that, in self-decep tion, the person who is deceived must also be doing the de ceiving, i.e., the self, by engaging in an act of deception (e.g., by "persuading himself to believe" not-p), is the agent of deception. But is it ever possible to be deceived without there being an agent who is engaging in an act of deception? I think it is possible: for example, a person of whom we say, "he is being deceived by appearances," i.e., the "appearances are deceiving" case-let us call this "ap pearance-deception." The appearance-deception case is one where a person may be deceived without an agent committing an act of d e c e p t i o n . 17 An example of appearance-deception could be the one of the straight stick which looks bent in water. In appearance-deception, the person is deceived by appearances and no one else has contrived appearances to mislead him.
In the inter-personal deception (other-deception) case we have an agent (deceiver) who engages in an act of deception on the victim (deceived). We can usually point to his act of deception, e.g., the villain, who knows p is true, intend ing to mislead, tells the victim that not-p is true and the victim is convinced of the truth of not-p. In the selfdeception case, we can readily establish that the selfdeceived is deceived but we have trouble ferreting out thê S e e footnote 5 above, especially Demos' description. 17 I take it that an act of deception involves volition, so that even if someone wanted to construe the appearance itself as somehow the agent of deception the volition aspect which is necessary to engage in an act of deception would be lacking. On the other hand, if one could somehow construe the person himself as somehow the agent of the act of decep tion in the appearance case then we are not talking about appearance-deception but about what is usually called selfdeception.
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act of deception. What would the self-deceived's act of de ception be. It might be argued that it is obvious what the act of deception is, viz., the self-deceived "persuades him self to believe" not-p. I shall discuss this notion later. What is important to realize at this point is that when we talk of deception there are at least two other kinds of de ception, i.e., other-deception and appearance-deception. In other-deception there is a deceived, a deceiver, and an act of deception. In appearance-deception there is a de ceived but not an act of deception. Obviously, it is not my intent here to assimilate appearance-deception to selfdeception but only to show that there are legitimate cases of deception which do not require an agent or an act of de ception, and this may help us to break the hold of the otherdeception model which could lead us to look for an agent and an act of deception.
The role of "self" in "self-deception" is to point out that the self is the cause of the deception but not that the self is engaging in an act of deception, just as the role of "appearance" in "appearance-deception" (e.g., "he is being deceived by appearances") is to show that appearances are the cause of the deception, but there is not an act of decep tion being committed. The function of "self" in "selfdeception" is to eliminate not only others as the cause of the deception but also to eliminate appearances as the cause of deception. In other words, it is not just that no other is deceiving us, which is what philosophers usually focus on and why they become captives of a certain picture (viz., other-deception), but it is also that appearances are not deceiving us. By bringing out the appearance-deception case we can now look at the self as cause in a different light. Just as appearance-deception means that the person is deceived and it is the appearance which causes his deception, so it is that in self-deception, he is deceived and it is the self which causes the deception. But in both cases there is no deceiver who knows, nor is there an act of deception being perpetrated on the one who is deceived. The self is the cause, not in the sense of the self taking an action to make oneself (persuade oneself) to believe not-p, but, rather, in the sense of the self having a false belief, which he takes as true and which he maintains even to the extent of distorting or ration alizing clearly contrary evidence. If we keep the appearancedeception case in mind as well as the other-deception case we will see that sometimes what a person does not know is what has to be emphasized to explain his deception. Keeping both appearance-deception and other-deception in mind helps to maintain our balance, but when we only have other-deception cases in mind all the weight seems to come down on the side of "he must know." 460 
G-S
VI
Sometimes it seems that those who maintain what I call the "he must know" view are not talking about self-deception at all but about someone who knows p, is reluctant to believe p, and wants to believe not-p, i.e., the reluctant one. How ever, if accused of this mistake, the rejoinder would be that although it is true that their picture of the self-deceived does allow for him to be portrayed that way, it is only if one takes "he persuades himself" as meaning he attempts to persuade himself but is not quite successful, in which case he wants to, but does not quite, believe not-p. "However," they could add, "we are not saying he tries to persuade him self and fails, but that he succeeds in persuading himself." This rejoinder brings us face to face once again with what may be our real "linguistic snake-in-the-grass" here, viz., "he persuades himself."
The first thing we should note about "he persuades him self to believe not-p" (or perhaps, an expression which is also quite common in our ordinary talk of self-deception, "he convinces himself") is that just as self-deception is modeled on other deception, so self-persuasion is modeled on other-persuasion.Let us look at a case of B (the person to be persuaded) as a person who knows p. Along comes A to persuade B of not-p. If A's persuasion is successful then B will drop his belief in p and now believe not-p, i.e., even if what B formerly believed was true, once A has persuaded him that not-p is true, B no longer believes p. If he still believes p then obviously the persuasion has failed and B has not been persuaded (or convinced) of not-p. In applying this view of persuading or convincing another to self-deception we can see that if A persuades (or convinces) himself of not-p then (1) he no longer believes (or knows) p or (2) he has not persuaded himself. If (1), i.e., if he does not know p, 18 Presumably, proponets of this view are not just using "he persuades himself of not-p" as being equivalent to "he deceives himself," but rather that the former comes first and the latter follows from it., i.e., A knows p and after persuading himself to believe not-p he enters a state of self-deception. In any case, there certainly is a distinction to be made between persuading and deceiving. I may persuade you that what you formerly believed is wrong and if what you formerly believed is, in fact, wrong then I have persuaded you, not deceived you.
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461 then according to the "he must know" view, he is not selfdeceived. If (2) holds then a crucial element of that view no longer pertains, viz., he did not persuade himself of notp. But if he is not persuaded of not-p then all we are left with is that he knows (and believes) p and does not believe not-p. Which means that self-deception does not pertain.
VII
Hovering in the background of the discussion so far is the shadow of intention in self-deception, i.e., can we talk of self-deception with-out bringing in intent to deceive? This question must now be confronted. The argument for in tention is that the self-deceived intentionally deceives him self, i.e., he persuades himself to believe the opposite of what he knows to be the case. This view takes as its funda mental assumption the notion that the self-deceived knows p. His intention, I want to maintain, is not to deceive himself (he does not say or think, "now I have to fool myself") but to put not-p in the best possible light. He selects and interprets the facts to suit himself. The result may be that he is deceived (about p) but his intention was to perserve his initial belief (about not-p), which he took as true. My view of his intention is not based on an unproven assumption but on what we (as observers of the self-deceived) do know, viz., the self-deceived believes not-p.
Some philosophers talk as if the self-deceived sets out to deceive himself, i.e., he knows what is the case but "pur posefully" deceives himself, he "persuades himself" to believe the opposite of what he knows to be true. In the only book written by a philosopher on self-deception we find this:
The crucial element which is necessary... is the element of purposefulness. If our subject persuades himself to believe contrary to the evidence in order to evade, somehow, the un pleasant truth to which he has already seen that the evidence points, then and only then is he clearly a self-deceiver.... It is cor rect to say that, even if we assume no motive, we would call a person self-deceived if he persuaded himself to believe what in his heart he knows is not so.-*-1 9 H. Fingarette, original).
Self-Deception, page 28 (italics in the
